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The Dark Side of Altruistic Third-Party 
Punishment
Andreas Leibbrandt1 and Rau´l Lo´pez-Pe´rez2
Abstract
This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties 
in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment 
exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties 
punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto 
efficient allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Interestingly, 
this form of punishment is especially pro-nounced in women and more left-
wing participants. Second, third parties punish strongly a decider if she 
chooses an equitable allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. 
Finally, third parties considerably punish passive parties who make no 
choice, especially if the latter are richer than the third party. Implications of 
these findings for social theory are discussed.
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Introduction
Contemporary theories in the fields of conflict resolution, economics, and political
science are often based on the hypothesis that all agents are selfish. This implies that
individuals will not damage, harm, or punish another individual if such behavior is
costly and provides no future material benefits. Yet a large body of experimental
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research has challenged this prediction. In the ultimatum game, for instance, respon-
ders frequently reject low offers from proposers (Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze
1982; Camerer and Thaler 1995), and noncooperators are often punished in social
dilemma games with a punishment stage (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992; Fehr
and Ga¨chter 2000). A possible interpretation of this evidence is that some agents are
motivated not only by their material interest but also by forces like a desire to retali-
ate against unfair actions (negative reciprocity; see Gouldner 1960; Rabin 1993;
Levine 1998), or a preference to achieve equitable allocations, even at a cost
(inequity aversion; see for instance Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
Suchnonselfishmotivesmayhave important behavioral consequences. Inparticular,
altruistic punishment, the costly damaging behavior observed in the previous experi-
ments,may deter people frombreaking social norms and informal agreements, thus fos-
tering cooperation and the well functioning of groups (Bowles and Gintis 2000; Fehr
andGa¨chter 2002). On the other hand, egalitarian preferences like those posited byFehr
and Schmidt (1999)may have additional far-reaching implications for the study of con-
flict and politics. We suggest four possible examples.
First, voters or politicians may support policies that foster equality at the cost of
social efficiency, even if those policies do not affect them. An example of such pol-
icies is mentioned in Elster (1999, 176), who suggests that those Chinese farmers
who were better off because they had fruit trees were ordered to cut them down dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. Second, individuals may favor income redistribution
even at a cost. On one hand, this implies that inegalitarian societies may be more
prone to social discontent and even conflict. This is for instance consistent with the
anthropological evidence in Knauft (1991) who argues that traditional societies that
followed egalitarian motives were sometimes characterized by large amounts of
violence. On the other hand, the achievement of egalitarian outcomes may alleviate
conflict—a finding that may be of practical use in conflict mediation (e.g.,
Thompson 2005). Third, strategies to cope with collective action problems
(Olson 1965) may be impaired if they lead to inequitable outcomes when agents have
varying interests in the collective good or different levels of income. To avoid the risk
of conflicts in such cases, it may be advisable to devise strategies so that agents con-
tribute in proportion to their income, and not only to their benefits from the good. A
possible illustration of this kind of problems is the polemic between developed and
underdeveloped countries with respect to the size of emission reductions to mitigate
global warming. Fourth, egalitarian tendencies may partially account for the develop-
ment of institutions. For instance, Boehm (1993, 1999) argues that many small-scale
societies are egalitarian and not based on strong dominance hierarchies, as leaders are
disciplined by potential collective sanctions, and he suggests that such institutional
design could be the result of some egalitarian ‘‘ethos.’’
In this article, we use laboratory experiments with two main objectives in mind:
(1) explore potential egalitarian motives to reduce others’ payoffs in order to achieve
payoff equality and (2) illustrate several consequences of these motives. Laboratory
experiments allow us to control for other motives like material interest and
reciprocity, which are difficult to separate from egalitarian motives in the field.
More precisely, our experiment consists of ten different one-shot games with three
players and different payoff allocations. In these games, a first party decides
between two allocations of payoffs between him and a second, passive party. Then,
a third party can reduce the payoff (i.e., punish) of any of the other parties (or both)
at a cost to himself (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).1 Since
the third party is an unaffected spectator who has not been harmed by the first party,
he has no retaliatory reason to punish. Further, he cannot have any self-interested
motive to punish: Punishing in our games is a costly behavior that cannot provide
any monetary benefit.
Studying third-party punishment seems especially important to understand norm
compliance because unaffected third parties are often more numerous than affected
second parties (Bendor and Swistak 2001) or the only parties present, and hence,
their sanctions are potentially more damaging than those from affected second par-
ties. Our results are in line with the idea that egalitarian motives play a prominent
role in punishment. Indeed, third parties often punish others, andwe observe that pun-
ishment is significantly correlated with the existence of a disadvantage in payoffs
between the third party and the punished party. Hence, our findings offer support for
recent economic preference models like Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which assume that
a significant proportion of the population dislikes having less than others and is will-
ing to incur personal costs to diminish others’ resources in order to reduce inequity.
In addition, our large variety of games allows us to find comprehensive evidence
for several implications of these egalitarian motives that qualify the literature on
altruistic punishment. While this literature has stressed the potential beneficial
effects of altruistic punishment on the well functioning of societies, we offer in this
article evidence that it can also exhibit arguably undesirable features. Put illustra-
tively, altruistic punishment can have a ‘‘dark side,’’ by which we mean three things.
First, we observe that third parties punish the decider strongly if she chooses a
socially efficient allocation (that is, onemaximizing the sum of payoffs) and becomes
the ‘‘richest’’ party as a result. Perhaps more strikingly, richer deciders are also fre-
quently punished even if their choices inflicted no harm on another party; that is, even
if they choose a Pareto-efficient allocation. Interestingly, this form of punitive beha-
vior is especially pronounced in women and more left-wing participants. This latter
finding is related to and extends the scope of earlier findings on individual differences
in redistribution preferences depending on political orientation and gender (e.g., Froh-
lich et al. 1984; Haidt and Graham 2007; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Graham, Haidt,
andNosek 2009; Alesina andGiuliano 2009). For example, Frohlich et al. (1984) find
that females who favor democratic parties are most likely to choose egalitarian out-
comes in decision experiments, and Haidt and Graham (2007) find that liberals are
less willing to accept outcome inequalities than conservatives. Further, Alesina and
Giuliano (2009) use data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and theWorld Value
Survey (WVS) and find that women tend to be more favorable toward redistribution
than do men in many different countries and institutional settings.
Second, we observe that third parties punish deciders if they choose the most
equitable allocation—that is, the one minimizing the payoff distance between
players—and become the ‘‘richest’’ party as a result. This is a subtle but important
issue, as it is often argued that people are punished if they behave ‘‘unfairly’’—for
example, low offers from proposers in the ultimatum game might be rejected
because they are less equitable than the equal sharing. Contrary to this interpretation,
our results indicate that equity in itself is not important for punishment but disadvan-
tageous inequity is.
Third, we observe that third parties frequently reduce the payoff of the passive
second party, but mostly if her payoff is higher than the third party’s payoff. Yet pas-
sive second parties are relatively less harmed than active first parties showing that
third parties take the innocence of second parties at least to some extent into account.
In any case, our results suggest that disadvantageous inequity is a key determinant of
aggression toward bystanders, an important issue given historical evidence and
countless law cases dealing with individuals who harmed bystanders or vandalized
their property. For instance, Wilson (1988) studies feuding in nineteenth-century
Corsica and argues that envy contributed to the occurrence of behaviors such as the
destruction of livestock, the cutting down of trees, or even the killing of humans.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents our experi-
mental design and procedures, whereas we report the results of our experiment after-
wards. The last section concludes with a discussion of these results.
Experimental Design and Procedures
Participants in our study play ten games. All games are three-player games and have
the same two-stage structure. In the first stage, one player (the first party) chooses
between a left-hand and right-hand allocation of payoffs between herself and another
player (the second party, or bystander). Table 1 shows the two allocations available
in each game, presented in points (10 points ¼ 1 Swiss franc).
In the second stage, the third party can punish the first party or/and the bystander.
Importantly, the third party is endowed with 200 points in each allocation of each
game, meaning that the first party’s choice never affects her payoff. The third party
can use up to 50 points to punish and each point spent reduces the payoff of the
Table 1. The Allocations in the Ten Games
Game
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Allocation Left (150,150) (100,100) (560,60) (150,90) (220,260) (280,240) (250,80) (100,100) (250,150) (250,150)
Right (590,60) (50,530) (120,140) (50,630) (220,400) (390,240) (80,250) (50,150) (110,290) (330,70)
Note: At each allocation, the left-hand payoff refers to the first party, and the right-hand payoff to the
bystander; the third party always has an endowment of 200 points.
punished player by three points. Hence, if the first party chooses allocation (x1, x2) in
a game and the third party punishes her with p1 points and the bystander with p2 points
(p1þ p2 50), the payoffs in this game are x1 3p1 for the first party, x2 3p2 for the
second party, and 200 p1 p2 for the third party. Notewell that the bystandermakes
no payoff relevant decision in any game; that is, she is a passive player (however, we
elicited second parties’ beliefs about the third party’s behavior in each game).2
We selected these ten games to perform a comprehensive study of (1) the punish-
ment of Pareto and socially efficient choices, (2) the punishment of equitable
allocations, and (3) the punishment of bystanders. Consider, for instance, game
3 (560/60 vs. 120/140) where the left-hand allocation is socially efficient and game
6 (280/240 vs. 390/240) where the right-hand allocation is Pareto efficient. We
were interested in how third parties react to the choice of socially/Pareto-
efficient allocations. In addition, these games allow us to study whether third
parties refrain from punishing the choice of equitable allocations, like the allocation
(280/240) in game 6. As another illustration, consider game 2 (100/100 vs. 50/530) and
game 7 (250/80 vs. 80/250) where the bystander gets in the left-hand allocations a
payoff lower than 200—that is, lower than the third party’s payoff—whereas she gets
a larger payoff in the right-hand allocations. Our games allowus to investigate plausible
determinants of the punishment of the bystander, like the payoff disadvantage between
her and the third party. Table A1 in the appendix shows themain features of each game.
A total of 165 participants took part in this experiment. Each participant was ran-
domly assigned a role and anonymously matched in groups of three. Participants
received role-dependent instruction sheets that explained the extensive form of the
games but did not provide information about payoff constellations. To make sure
that participants understood the rules they had to fill out control questions. We used
neutral language and avoided terms such as ‘punishment.’ Every participant always
played the ten games in the same role, and the ten games were presented one at a
time. Further, the order in which they were played was randomly predefined for each
group. Participants were never told about their counterparts’ previous choices to pre-
vent repeated game effects and changes of mood, which could generate history
effects. For this reason, we employed the strategy method to elicit the punishment
decisions of the third parties, that is, in each game, they had to indicate for both allo-
cations the number of punishment points (0–50) that they wanted to assign to the
other participants.3 Only one game was randomly selected for payment at the end
of the experiment in order to prevent income effects. These features imply that each
game can be treated as a one-shot game—even though subjects were always
matched with the same participants.
The experiment lasted approximately 60 minutes and was conducted with the
Z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Most participants were students from the
University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (9 percent
of them came from the faculty of economics and management). Average earnings
were 30 Swiss francs (around $ 24) including a show-up fee of 10 Swiss francs (this
fee could be accordingly reduced if one subject got a negative point score as a result of
heavy punishment, although this never happened). The instructions for the third party
are provided in the appendix B.
Experimental Results
This section starts with a brief overview of the punishment behavior of third parties.
Thereafter, we study how third parties react to socially efficient (Punishment of
Socially Efficient and Inefficient Choices section) and equitable choices (section Pun-
ishment of Equitable Choices), and whether and when bystanders become victims of
punishment (Bystander Damaging section). Overall, we observe that 54 percent of the
third parties punish at least once. On average, first parties are punished by 19.3 percent
of the third parties and bystanders by 12.1 percent in each allocation. In terms of the
strength of punishment, third parties reduce the payoff of the other two players by
approximately 380 points, that is, on average by 19 points per allocation. They reduce
the payoff of first parties significantly more than the payoff of bystanders (on average
12.9 compared to 6.1 points per allocation,Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z¼ 3.672, p¼
.0002). Table 2 summarizes the frequency and damage (i.e., point reduction) of third-
party punishment, distinguishing between punishment for first parties and bystanders.
Table A2 in the appendix shows the behavior of the first parties.
The size of the (disadvantageous) payoff difference between the third party and
the other parties seems to be a major factor in explaining punishment in our
games. To illustrate this issue, Figure 1 depicts the individual punishment deci-
sions from the third parties who punish at least once dependent on the size of the
payoff differences. The horizontal axis indicates the payoff difference between the
third and the punished party (the dashed vertical line corresponds to zero distance;
Table 2. Frequency and Damage of Punishment—Third Parties
First party Second p. (bystander)
Game Left Right Left Right
1 (150,150) vs. (590,60) .06 (0.9) .44 (44.1) .09 (1.5) .04 (0.9)
2 (100,100) vs. (50,530) .11 (8.7) .06 (1.2) .04 (2.7) .26 (27.9)
3 (560,60) vs. (120,140) .45 (44.1) .07 (2.4) .06 (0.9) .15 (4.5)
4 (150,90) vs. (50,630) .29 (11.4) .07 (3.6) .04 (2.1) .26 (20.7)
5 (220,260) vs. (220,400) .24 (9.6) .09 (2.7) .13 (4.5) .22 (16.5)
6 (280,240) vs. (390,240) .22 (10.8) .33 (23.1) .11 (2.7) .13 (3.0)
7 (250,80) vs. (80,250) .29 (19.8) .02 (0.3) .02 (0.3) .24 (12.3)
8 (100,100) vs. (50,150) .06 (1.2) .04 (1.5) .06 (1.2) .18 (6.0)
9 (250,150) vs. (110,290) .26 (15.0) .06 (3.9) .02 (1.2) .22 (13.5)
10 (250,150) vs. (330,70) .26 (15.0) .44 (38.4) .11 (1.5) .04 (0.3)
Note: Numbers outside the parentheses indicate the frequency of punishment. Average damage (i.e., point
reduction) by all participants in parentheses. The endowment of the third party is always 200 points.
Fifty-five observations were made in each allocation of each game.
to the right of this line the third party gets less than the punished party). The loca-
tion of the dots indicates the number of points spent from third parties depending
on the distance. The size of the dots is proportional to the number of observations,
that is, given a payoff distance between another player and the third party, a dot
becomes larger as more and more third parties spend the same amount to punish
that player.4 The figure suggests that payoff differences play an important role
in the decision to punish. In fact, third parties rarely punish if their payoffs are
higher than that of the first/second party but often and severely if their payoffs
are lower.
Figure 1 also suggests that much of the observed punishment is in line with the
model of inequity-aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They assume that people
derive disutility from disadvantageous inequity toward any other player (weighted
by a factor of a/n 1, where n is the number of players and a > 0), and from advan-
tageous inequity toward any other player (analogously weighted by a factor b/n 
1, where b > 0 is the corresponding coefficient). Taking into account that our
games can be treated as one-shot games due to our experimental design, their
model hence predicts that an inequity-averse third party with a > 2 would punish
the richer coplayer at any allocation, but never a poorer coplayer (if both coplayers
are richer, the third party would be indifferent regarding whom to punish). The pre-
cise predictions by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) regarding the occurrence of punish-
ment in our games are shown in Table A3 in the appendix. In Leibbrandt and
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Figure 1. Third-party punishment depending on payoff differences
Lo´pez-Pe´rez (2009), we apply to our data a classification analysis that provides
further evidence that the punishment pattern of third parties is largely in line with
inequity-aversion.5
Punishment of Socially Efficient and Inefficient Choices
In this section, we concentrate our attention on games 1 through 6, which have a unique
allocationmaximizing the sumof payoffs—that is, a socially efficient allocation. These
games allow us to explore two questions: (1) Do third parties react punitively when the
first party chooses a socially efficient allocation, thus generating a great payoff gain to
one of the parties at a small or null payoff loss for the other party? and (2) Do third
parties punish the first party for choosing socially inefficient allocations? The answer
to the first question is affirmative, under one condition.
 Result 1a: Third parties punish the first party frequently and strongly if she
chooses the socially efficient allocation, but only if she becomes the richest party
as a result. This is true even if no one is harmed by the first party’s choice.
Evidence for Result 1a. We focus first on games 1 (150/150 vs. 590/60), 3 (560/60
vs. 120/140), and 6 (280/240 vs. 390/240), where the first party gets the highest
payoff in the socially efficient allocation. In these games, the frequency of punish-
ment for the first party when she chooses this allocation is 44, 45, and 33 percent,
respectively. These percentages are substantially above the average frequency of
punishment for the first party (19.3 percent).
Punishment of the socially efficient choice in these games is not only frequent but
also in terms of strength clearly above average. In fact, the socially efficient alloca-
tions in games 1 and 3 are the most strongly punished allocations in our experiment
(44.1 points reduction in both). Even in game 6, the punishment of the first party for
choosing the Pareto-dominant allocation is clearly above average (23.1 points reduc-
tion; recall that average point reduction for the first party across all allocations is
12.9 points). This latter result shows that third parties punish a socially efficient
choice even if it harms nobody. Further, we note that the socially efficient choice
is punished significantly more than the alternative choice in all of these games
(game 1: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, z ¼ 4.628, p < .0001; game 3: z ¼ 4.934,
p < .0001; game 6: z ¼ 2.590, p < .001).
Consider now games 2 (100/100 vs. 50/530), 4 (150/90 vs. 50/630), and 5
(220/260 vs. 220/400). In these games, the first party does not get the highest
payoff if she chooses the socially efficient allocation. In line with Result 1a,
we observe little and modest punishment for the first party if she chooses the effi-
cient allocation: The frequency of punishment (6, 7, and 9 percent, respectively)
is always well below the 19 percent average frequency of punishment across allo-
cations, and the average reduction in points in these efficient allocations (1.2, 3.6,
and 2.7, respectively) is also clearly below the average point reduction across
allocations (12.9). Note that these results are also below the above cited values of
frequency and severity of punishment in games 1, 3, and 6.
In order to obtain a more accurate picture of this issue, we pass now to consider a
natural, related question, that is, do third parties punish socially inefficient choices?
The answer is again positive, under some conditions.
 Result 1b: If the first party chooses a socially inefficient allocation in which the
first and the second party do not get the same payoff, third parties punish the first
party considerably, provided that at least one of the following conditions holds:
(i) the inefficient choice reduces the bystander’s payoff (compared to the alter-
native) and (ii) the first party gets a larger payoff than the third party.
Evidence for Result 1b. Consider first games 4 (150/90 vs. 50/630), 5 (220/260 vs.
220/400), and 6 (280/240 vs. 390/240). In these games, there is no strict equality of
payoffs. Moreover, at least one of the above mentioned conditions (i) and (ii) is sat-
isfied. We observe that punishment of the socially inefficient choice is relatively fre-
quent (29, 24, and 22 percent, respectively) and moderately harsh (11.4, 9.6, and
10.8 points reduction, respectively). Furthermore, games 4 and 6 suggest that con-
ditions (i) and (ii) are each on their own sufficient for the occurrence of considerable
punishment (in game 5, both conditions hold). Observe also that third parties punish
the socially inefficient choice significantly more than the alternative choice in
game 4 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z ¼ 2.510, p ¼ .012) and game 5 (z ¼ 2.909,
p ¼ .0036). This does not happen in game 6, where our previous Result 1a applies.
That conditions (i) and (ii) are both important is further suggested by game 3
(560/60 vs. 120/140), where none of these conditions hold. Indeed, punishment of
the first party in the socially inefficient allocation is infrequent (7 percent) and mod-
est (2.4 points reduction). Finally, games 1 (150/150 vs. 590/60) and 2 (100/100 vs.
50/530) suggest that strict equality of payoffs has an alleviating effect on punish-
ment, even if condition (i) holds, as in game 2. In these games, the frequency of pun-
ishment of the socially inefficient choice is well below average (6 and 11 percent,
respectively), and the same is true for the strength of punishment (0.9 and 8.7 points
reduction, respectively). We further clarify the effect of strict payoff equality in the
Punishment of Equitable Choices section.
We emphasize again that the evidence in Results 1a and 1b (especially Result 1a)
is largely consistent with inequity-aversion as modeled in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
This model does not only account well for the occurrence of punishment but also for
the observed intensity of punishment. The latter point is nicely illustrated by the
above mentioned evidence from game 6 (280/240 vs. 390/240), where we observe
that the first party gets significantly more punished if she increases the payoff dis-
tance to the other players by choosing the Pareto-dominant allocation 390/240. Yet
it is worthy to stress that payoff differences are not the only significant factor behind
third-party punishment. Indeed, we have noted before that the choice of the socially
inefficient allocation in game 4 (150/90 vs. 50/630) is punished frequently and
considerably, which is obviously at odds with inequity aversion, and points out the
significance of other motivations. For instance, third parties might punish the first
party if her choice harms the passive party, that is, if the decider chooses in a game
the allocation with the smallest bystander’s payoff—that is, third parties may be
motivated by indirect reciprocity (Seinen and Schram 2006).
In contrast, other recent economic models on nonselfish preferences do not seem
to provide much additional insights. Thus, the model by Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) cannot rationalize much of the observed third-party punishment, as it predicts
no punishment in games 1 (150/150 vs. 590/60), 3 (560/60 vs. 120/140), and 4 (150/
90 vs. 50/630), where we observe considerable punishment.6 To understand these
predictions, note that this model predicts punishment of the first and/or the second
party in any allocation if the third party can use punishment to bring her relative
payoff closer to 1/3, the equitable relative payoff in three-player games. More
precisely, let s¼ x1þ x2þ 200 denote the sum of players’ payoffs at any allocation
and hence 200/s denote the third party’s relative payoff. Clearly, this relative payoff
is smaller than 1/3 if 400 < x1 þ x2, whereas p units of punishment (which imply a
reduction of 3p points in the payoff of the sanctioned party) increase the relative
payoff if 200  ps p  p >
200
s $ s < 800$ x1 þ x2 < 600. Hence, Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) predict punishment only if 400 < x1 þ x2 < 600, which is not satisfied at any
allocation in games 1, 3, and 4.
Further, a theory assuming that people punish anyone who does not choose a
socially efficient allocation but never someone who chooses a socially efficient
allocation is clearly at odds with the data. The model by Levine (1998) also
fares badly because it assumes that some types of people punish others if they
believe them to be selfish or spiteful, but not if they are altruistic-in other
words, if they care about social efficiency. Now, the choice of the efficient allo-
cation in the above-mentioned games 1, 3, and 6 is hardly a clear signal of being
selfish (an altruistic type would also choose it), but it is punished harshly.
Further, Levine (1998) predicts that the choice of the socially inefficient alloca-
tion in game 2 (100/100 vs. 50/530) should be a clear signal of selfishness and
hence should be harshly punished, which is again at odds with the observed
behavior.7
We finish this section with a discussion of whether the punishment of
socially efficient choices is gender specific and related to the individual political
orientation. While there is experimental evidence that there are gender differ-
ences in pro-social behavior more generally (for a survey see Croson and
Gneezy [2009]), we are not aware of experimental studies relating gender and
political orientation to the punishment of socially efficient choices.8 Thus, our
following two findings provide new suggestive evidence that still has to stand
the test of replication.
 Result 1c: On average, women punish socially efficient choices—even if they
are Pareto-efficient—more frequently and significantly more than do men.
Evidence for Result 1c. Seventeen out of our 55 third parties are women. Focusing
our analysis on those games with a unique socially efficient choice—that is, games 1
through 6—we find that the fraction of women who punish at least once such choice is
larger than that ofmen (59 percent women and 45 percent men) and that women reduce
the first party’s payoff more than twice compared to men (195.15 vs. 84.54 points
reduction in all efficient allocations,Wilcoxon-Rank sum test, z¼ 1.848, p¼ .064; T-test,
t¼2.54, p¼ .0138). Interestingly, women punish also the first party stronger in game 6
when she chooses the Pareto-efficient allocation 390/240 (z ¼ 2.086, p ¼ .037).
Note, however, that women do not punish socially inefficient choices in these games
more than do men (women¼ 12.06 points, men¼ 15.71 points, t¼ 0.274, p¼ .783).
 Result 1d: Left-wing participants punish socially efficient and inefficient choices
significantly more than do right-wing participants.
Evidence for Result 1d. At the end of the experiment, we asked third parties about
their political orientation on a nine-point scale (0 ¼ left-wing, 9 ¼ right-wing). The
most centered political orientations (3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) were each one crossed by more
than 10 percent of the participants. Further, we observe that the more left-wing
participants consider themselves on the scale, the more they spend on punishing the
first party for choosing socially efficient allocations (Spearman rank correlation;
r ¼ 0.294, p ¼ .029) in games 1 through 6. Note in addition, that participants who
consider themselves more left-wing tend also to punish socially inefficient choices
more (Spearman rank correlation; r ¼ 0429, p ¼ .001).
Punishment of Equitable Choices
In our games, we say that the allocation with the smallest distance between the low-
est and the highest payoff is the equitable allocation of the game. Do third parties
punish the first party if she makes an equitable choice?
 Result 2a: Third parties punish the first party considerably if she chooses the
equitable allocation, but only if at least one of two conditions holds: (i) this
choice damages the bystander’s payoff and (ii) the first party gets a larger
payoff than the third party. Strict payoff equality, however, alleviates
punishment.
Evidence for Result 2a. We already offered evidence in this regard for games 1
through 6 when commenting Result 1b, as the equitable choice in these games hap-
pens to be at the same time the socially inefficient choice. Hence, we concentrate on
the remaining games. Consider first games 9 (250/150 vs. 110/290) and 10 (250/150
vs. 330/70): in the equitable allocation (250/150), the first party gets always a larger
payoff than does the third party. In line with our result, the first party gets frequently
and relatively harshly punished (the frequency and strength of punishment is above
average in both games). Observe that this is true even when the equitable choice in
game 10 does not damage the bystander’s payoff: third parties punish a richer first
party, even if she makes an equitable choice that is ‘‘kind’’ toward the bystander.
Given the previous evidence, it seems problematic to argue that third parties pun-
ish first parties mainly because their choices are unfair—that is, less fair than the
alternative choice.9 Further evidence in this respect comes from game 7 (250/80
vs. 80/250), where we observe that third parties punish even if both allocations are
arguably equally fair. In fact, game 7 shows something more: as both allocations in
this game are equally fair from the viewpoint of any impartial criterion of distribu-
tive justice (not only efficient or egalitarian ones), it seems that punishment cannot
be explained alone as a reaction to a transgression of any reasonable norm of distri-
butive justice. In contrast, the previous evidence is again in line with models that
assume some form of inequity aversion (like Fehr and Schmidt 1999). As further evi-
dence in this respect, we observe in game 10 that the punishment of the equitable
choice (250/150), although relatively high, is smaller (in frequency and strength)
than the punishment of the alternative allocation (330/70). This could be explained
by the fact that the payoff disadvantage increases if the alternative, inequitable allo-
cation is chosen—note that the same occurs in game 6 (280/240 vs. 390/240).
Finally, game 8 (100/100 vs. 50/150) provides evidence for the last sentence in
Result 2a: equitable allocations in which both first and second parties get the same
payoff are rarely and mildly punished. In game 8, for instance, allocation 100/100 is
punished by 6 percent of the third parties, and the average point reduction is just 1.2
points. This raises the question whether strictly equal allocations are differently
treated compared to slightly unequal allocations.
 Result 2b: The choice of a strictly equal allocation is punished relatively less,
especially when that choice harms the bystander.
Evidence for Result 2b. We focus first in the games where a strictly equal alloca-
tion is available, that is, games 1 (150/150 vs. 590/60), 2 (100/100 vs. 50/530), and 8
(100/100 vs. 50/150). Indeed, that choice is rarely and mildly punished in these
games: frequency is 6 percent in games 1 and 8, and 11 percent in game 2, and inten-
sity is highest in game 2, with an average of 8.7 points reduction. In a comparison
across games, the choice of the strictly equal allocation in game 2 is less frequently
punished (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z ¼ 2.018, p ¼ .043) than the choice of allo-
cation (150/90) in game 4 (150/90 vs. 50/630). Observe that the comparison between
games 2 and 4 seems justified because the alternative to the equitable allocation is
very similar in both. For similar reasons, we can also compare games 1 and 3 (560/60
vs. 120/140). In these games, the choice of the equitable allocation does not harm the
bystander. In line with the qualification stated in Result 2b, the strictly equal alloca-
tion in game 1 appears to have no alleviating impact on punishment, as it is not pun-
ished less than the slightly unequal allocation in game 3 (z ¼ 1.350, p ¼ .177).
We now consider a related question: Does the existence of strictly equal alloca-
tions affect punishment decisions at alternative allocations? In particular, are first
parties punished more if they deviate from a strictly equal allocation than if they
deviate from a slightly unequal allocation? We are motivated in this respect by Gu¨th,
Huck, and Mu¨ller (2001) who report that the rate of rejection of the (proposer and
responder) sharing proposal (17, 3) in three mini-ultimatum games depends on
the alternative, which differs across games—that is (11, 9), (9, 11), and (10, 10). The
authors conclude from their analysis that ‘‘The general message of these results
[ . . . ] is that fairness concerns may be less pronounced in settings where splitting
equally is impossible’’ (p. 166). With regard to the punishment of inequitable allo-
cations by third parties, we do not find such phenomenon.10
 Result 2c: A deviation from an strictly equal allocation is not punished relatively
more.
Evidence for Result 2c. Consider again the comparison between games 1 (150/150
vs. 590/60) and 3 (560/60 vs. 120/140). We observe that the alternative allocation is
not punished more in game 1, where it constitutes a deviation from strict equality,
than in game 3 (z ¼ 0.023, p ¼ .981). The same is true when comparing games 2
and 4.
Bystander Damaging
Until now, we concentrated on the punishment of the active first parties. We now
turn to the investigation of the punishment of the passive second parties, that is, the
bystanders.
 Result 3a: Third parties damage the bystander considerably, but almost exclu-
sively if the bystander is richer than the third party.
Evidence for Result 3a. There are five allocations in which more than 20 percent of
the third parties damage the bystander (the right-hand allocation of games 2, 4, 5, 7,
and 9; recall that the average frequency of punishment of the bystander across allo-
cations is 12.1 percent). In all these allocations the bystander’s payoff exceeds the
third party’s payoff. Importantly, the intensity of punishment is above the average
of 6.1 points only in these allocations, and it positively depends on the size of the
payoff distance between the bystander and the third party.
To clarify this latter point, we first classify our allocations in three groups,
depending on whether the bystander is (i) considerably richer (at least 100 points),
(ii) richer, and (iii) poorer than the third party at that allocation. We observe that the
average punishment of the bystander in these groups is respectively (i) 21.54,
(ii) 12.60, and (iii) 1.86. Richer bystanders are significantly more damaged than poorer
bystanders by the third parties (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z ¼ 3.120, p ¼ .0018).
These results are further confirmedby anOLS regression analysis,which shows that the
strength of punishment significantly increases with the payoff distance. For each 100
points in payoff difference, the third party reduces the bystander’s payoff by 5.79 points
(t ¼ 3.59, p < .001).
 Result 3b: Bystanders are treated differently than are active parties.
Evidence for Result 3b. To start, note that bystanders are overall punished
significantly less strongly than first parties (z ¼ 3.672, p ¼ .0002). This is nicely
illustrated by game 7 (250/80 vs. 80/250), where the third party gets 50 points
less than the first (second) party in the left- (right-) hand allocation. While about
the same percentage of first parties and bystanders are damaged when they
are advantaged (29 vs. 24 percent; chi-square test, p ¼ .516), there are signifi-
cant differences in the average strength of punishment (19.8 vs. 12.3 points,
z ¼ 2.076; p ¼ .0378). Table 3 depicts the results from an OLS regression that
further clarifies this issue. In this regression, the dependent variable is the
strength of punishment toward any party at each allocation and the independent
variables are the payoff difference between the third and other party and a
bystander dummy (this variable takes the value one if the punishment is directed
toward a bystander). The significantly negative coefficient for the bystander
dummy shows that bystanders are punished by 2.05 points less after controlling
for payoff differences. This provides further evidence that bystanders are treated
differently than first parties. In addition, we find suggestive evidence that
women tend to punish bystanders more strongly than men (Wilcoxon-Rank sum
test, z ¼ 1.814, p ¼ .068; but T-test, t ¼ 1.163, p ¼ .250) and that more left-
wing participants have a tendency to punish bystanders more strongly, which is,
however, not yet significant at the 10 percent level (Spearman rank correlation,
p ¼ .204, p ¼ .134).
Result 3b is in line with previous empirical literature that stresses the role of
intentions (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003, 2008): As bystanders are not respon-
sible for any outcome, they are less affected by punishment as compared to active
parties. Note that models of inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000), which do not incorporate intentions, cannot explain this different
punishment pattern.
Table 3. Determinants of Third-Party Punishment
Payoff difference between third and other party 0.022*** (0.003)
Bystander dummy 2.051*** (0.700)
Constant 3.960*** (0.516)
R2 0.126
Note: N ¼ 2,200. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on individual level.
*** signifies p < .01.
Conclusion
This article studies altruistic punishment from unaffected third parties and finds
that they punish deciders strongly for choosing the socially efficient allocation
and becoming the ‘‘richer’’ party as a result, even if their choices inflicted no
harm on another party. Interestingly, this form of punitive behavior seems espe-
cially pronounced in women and more left-wing participants. We also find con-
siderable punishment of deciders if they choose an equitable allocation and get
the highest payoff or harm the bystander—however, strict equality alleviates this
latter type of punishment. Furthermore, with regard to the damaging of bystan-
ders we find that their payoff is frequently diminished by third parties but only
if they are richer than the third party. Overall, we observe that a disadvantage in
payoffs between the third party and another party is positively correlated with
the frequency and strength of punishment toward the latter party. For this rea-
son, our data is consistent to a large extent with models that integrate
inequity-aversion as a motivation for punishment (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Falk
and Fischbacher 2006).
To the best of our knowledge, our experiment is the first to study how third
parties react to the choice of socially efficient or equitable allocations and how
they react toward bystanders. Moreover, our study complements previous studies
that report some punishment from affected second parties, which is not moti-
vated to establish cooperation (Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter 2008; Nikiforakis
2008; Reuben and Riedl 2009) and the handicapping of receivers in binary dic-
tator games (Charness and Grosskopf 2001; Charness and Rabin 2002) and in
money-burning games (Zizzo 2003; Dawes et al. 2007).
Our findings might have several implications for policy makers or scholars
interested in conflict resolution. Because participants punish socially efficient
allocations even if they are Pareto-dominant, policies and institutions that cre-
ate larger inequalities may have severe negative side effects, even if they
improve everyone’s income; it can therefore be beneficial to complicate or
avoid punishment altogether, or alternatively look for strictly equal outcomes,
which induce much less destruction of the pie. In this respect, our results also
suggest that many people may have a preference for the redistribution of
resources in order to achieve fair allocations. Finally, the role of third parties
in acting as mediators and moderators of conflict should be taken with care,
among other things because they even damage bystanders. Our results suggest
that many third parties are not impartial and hence can hardly be regarded as
ideal or ‘‘neutral mediators’’ (Princen 1992), at least if one considers that
impartiality is an important attribute.11 This relates to evidence on the beha-
vior of jury members in law cases showing that third parties can make inap-
propriate decisions in the context of sanctioning (e.g., Kennedy 1997) and
studies that also questions the usefulness of third parties as mediators in civil
conflicts (e.g., Regan 2002).
Table A3. Theoretical Punishment Predictions
Game
Theories predicting punishment
for the first party
Theories predicting punishment
for the bystander
Allocation Allocation Allocation
Left Right Left Right Left Right
1 (150,150) vs. (590,60) —— IA —— ——
2 (100,100) vs. (50,530) —— ERC —— IA, ERC
3 (560,60) vs. (120,140) IA —— —— ——
4 (150,90) vs. (50,630) —— —— —— IA
5 (220,260) vs. (220,400) IA, ERC IA IA, ERC IA
6 (280,240) vs. (390,240) IA, ERC IA IA, ERC IA
7 (250,80) vs. (80,250) IA —— —— IA
8 (100,100) vs. (50,150) —— —— —— ——
9 (250,150) vs. (110,290) IA —— —— IA
10 (250,150) vs. (330,70) IA IA —— ——
Note: IA ¼ inequity-aversion (as in Fehr and Schmidt 1999); ERC ¼ Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
Appendix A
Table A1. Main Characteristics of the Ten Games
Game
In the unique
socially efficient
allocation, whose is
higher?
In the most
equitable
allocation
whose is higher?
Strictly
equal
allocation
available?
Pareto-dominant
allocation
available?
Second
party’s > 200
at any
allocation?
1 (150,150) vs. (590,60) First party (FP) — YES NO NO
2 (100,100) vs. (50,530) Second party (SP) — YES NO YES
3 (560,60) vs. (120,140) FP SP NO NO NO
4 (150,90) vs. (50,630) SP FP NO NO YES
5 (220,260) vs. (220,400) SP SP NO YES YES
6 (280,240) vs. (390,240) FP FP NO YES YES
7 (250,80) vs. (80,250) — — NO NO YES
8 (100,100) vs. (50,150) — — YES NO NO
9 (250,150) vs. (110,290) — FP NO NO YES
10 (250,150) vs. (330,70) — FP NO NO NO
Table A2. Observed Frequencies of Choices from First Parties
Game Left Right
1 (150,150) vs. (590,60) 0.11 0.89
2 (100,100) vs. (50,530) 0.82 0.18
3 (560,60) vs. (120,140) 0.98 0.02
4 (150,90) vs. (50,630) 0.87 0.13
5 (220,260) vs. (220,400) 0.18 0.82
6 (280,240) vs. (390,240) 0.07 0.93
7 (250,80) vs. (80,250) 1 0
8 (100,100) vs. (50,150) 1 0
9 (250,150) vs. (110,290) 0.96 0.04
10 (250,150) vs. (330,70) 0.18 0.82
Appendix B
General Instructions for the Third Party
We welcome you to our experiment. If you read the following instructions care-
fully you will be able to earn money in addition to your show up fee of 10 Swiss
Francs—depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants.
Therefore it is very important, that you read the following instructions carefully.
If you have any question, please address them to us.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants. If you do
not follow this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will
not be able to earn money.
In this experiment you will have to make one decision in ten different situations
that can influence your payoff. The order of these ten situations is randomly deter-
mined. At the end of the experiment, a ten-sided dice will be thrown to determine
which of the ten situations becomes relevant for your payment.
In this experiment we always speak of points. 10 points are worth 1 Swiss Franc.
10 points ¼ 1 Swiss Franc.
There are three types of participants in this experiment: participant A, partici-
pant B and participant C. You are participant C. You will never get to know the
identity of any participant A (B or C), nor will any participant get to know who
you are. The payment at the end of the experiment is also anonymous, that is, no
other participant will know how much you earned in this experiment.
Exact Description of the Experiment for Participant C
Each of the ten situations consists of two stages. In the following, we will explain
these two stages.
The First Stage
In the first stage, participant A makes his decision. He can decide between two
allocations. Take for instance the following example. If he decides for the allocation
on the left side, he gets 300 points and you get 100 points. If he decides for the
allocation on the right side, he gets 250 points and you get 150 points. Independently
of participant A’s choice, you will always get 200 points in all ten situations.
A: 300
B: 100
A: 250
B: 150
A
C: 200 
The Second Stage
In the second stage, you make your decision. You can assign deduction points to
participant A and/or participant B. Every deduction point you assign to participant A
(or participant B), reduces your payoff by 1 point and the payoff of participant A (or
B) by 3 points. You can assign in total between 0 and 50 deduction points. For
instance, if you assign 50 deduction points to participant A, your payoff is reduced
by 50 points and the payoff of participant A by 150 points. If you assign 30 deduc-
tion points to participant B, your income is reduced by 30 points and the payoff of
participant B by 90 points.
Time Line of the Experiment
You will have to decide how many deduction points you assign in all ten differ-
ent situations before you know which allocation participant A has chosen in the
first stage of the situations. We will present you the two different allocations in
each situation and you will have to decide how many deduction points you
assign in each allocation. While you are making your decisions, participant A
will choose one allocation in each situation and participant B will be asked how
many deduction points you will assign. After all participants have made their
decisions in the ten situations, the experiment is over. One situation will be ran-
domly determined by a ten-sided dice and you will be paid according to your
decision in this situation.
Calculation of Payoffs
The payoffs of participant A, B and C are calculated as follows:
The payoff of participant A ¼
þ Points for A in the allocation participant A has chosen in the game that
was chosen by the dice
 3 the deduction points you assigned to participant A in the game that
was chosen by the dice
The payoff of participant B ¼
þ Points for B in the allocation participant A has chosen in the game that
was chosen by the dice
 3 the deduction points you assigned to participant B in the game that
was chosen by the dice
Your payoff (participant C) ¼
þ 200 Points (your endowment)
– The deduction points you assigned to participant A in the game that was
chosen by the dice
– The deduction points you assigned to participant B in the game that was
chosen by the dice
Exact Description of the Experiment on the
Computer Screen for Participant C
In the second stage of the first situation, you will have to decide howmany deduction
points you assign. The following computer screen will appear:
After that, you will make your decision in the second, third, . . . , tenth
situation.
You can take as much time as you need. The OK-Button appears with a little time
delay.
If you have made your decisions in all ten situations, you will be informed about
your payoff.
Please answer now the following control questions and raise your hand if you
have answered them. The experiment starts as soon as all participants have correctly
filled out the control questions.
Control Questions
1. Participant A chooses the allocation on the left side.
a) Participant C assigns 0 deduction points to participant B.
What is the payoff of participant A? .......... B?.......... C?............
A: 300
B: 100
A: 250
B: 150
A
C: 200 
b) Participant C assigns 30 deduction points to participant B.
What is the payoff of participant A? .......... B?.......... C?............
2. Participant A chooses the allocation on the right side.
a) Participant C assigns 0 deduction points to participant A.
What is the payoff of participant A? .......... B?.......... C?............
A: 200
B: 250
A: 300
B: 50
 A
C: 200 
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Notes
1. Two terminological caveats are due. First, as is usual in the experimental literature, we
use the terms punishment or sanction as synonyms of ‘‘damaging behavior’’ and not only
to refer to that damaging behavior, which is directed toward a wrongdoer, as is most usual
in common use. Second, we say that a player C is a third party with respect to a player A if
her material payoff does not depend on the decisions of A (note however that the material
payoff of A may depend on the decisions of C; for instance, it could be the case that C
punishes A and thus reduces her material payoff).
2. As we report in Leibbrandt and Lo´pez-Pe´rez (2009), these beliefs were on average rather
accurate.
3. In principle, this method might induce a different behavior than the specific response
method, where participants know the choice made by the other player. However, Falk
et al. (2005) investigate this issue and find no differences in subjects’ punishment patterns,
although the strength of punishment is somewhat lower overall with the strategy method.
One further advantage of the strategy method is that it maximizes the amount of statistical
data gathered.
4. If there is more than one allocation with the same payoff difference, we weight the beha-
vior in these allocations uniformly.
5. This companion paper also provides data from an experiment on second party punish-
ment. The phenomena that we report here for third-party punishment also extend to sec-
ond party punishment, with just one exception (see the Punishment of Equitable Choices
section).
6. The same is also true in games 7 (250/80 vs. 80/250), 9 (250/150 vs. 110/290), and 10
(250/150 vs. 330/70). Table A3 in the appendix shows the predictions of Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) in our games.
7. Finally, a pure model of reciprocity like Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) predicts
multiple equilibria in our games depending on second-order beliefs (a proof of this can
be requested to the authors). In any game, however, this model predicts at least one equi-
librium in which the third party never punishes. This equilibrium is clearly at odds with
our data.
8. Eckel and Grossman (1996) also report gender differences in punishing. They find that
women are more sensitive to the price of punishment than are men.
9. However, third parties might believe that their behavior is compatible with such a fairness
argument. Talking on envy, Elster (1999, 165) notes that ‘‘When it leads to action, it is
usually mediated by the prior transmutation into a more acceptable emotion, such as
righteous anger or righteous indignation.’’ This is relevant in our setting, where some
form of envy or inequity aversion seems to account for a large part of the punishment.
10. In another experiment, we have studied second party punishment in a set of 10 games
analogous to our games. In this setting, we observe sometimes that deviations from
strictly equal allocations are punished more. The data are available upon request from
the authors.
11. There is some debate in this respect in the literature on mediation—see Kleiboer (1996)
for a survey that considers this issue.
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